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Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 259 A.2d 451 (1969).
In Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R.,' the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that reversible error was committed by allowing an
expert medical witness to testify at trial although his identity was
not revealed in answer 2 to a timely interrogatory 3 seeking the
names of all medical authorities consulted by plaintiffs. The ma-
jor policy, pervasive throughout the decision, is the limitation of
the springing of "surprise witnesses."
'4
1. 435 Pa. 503, 259 A.2d 451 (1969).
2. Plaintiff asserted that no answer was required pursuant to PA.
R. C. P. 4011 (d) which provides:
No discovery or inspection shall be permitted which would dis-
close the existence or location of reports, memoranda, statements,
information or other things made or secured by any person or party
in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial or would ob-
tain any such thing from a party or his insurer, or the attorney
or agent of either of them, other than information as to the identity
or whereabouts of witnesses.
3. The interrogatory objected to read as follows: "'State the name
and address of each physician whom plaintiff or anyone acting on her
behalf has consulted as to whether or not there is a causal connection
between the accident referred to in the complaint and the decedent's
death.'" Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 506, 259 A.2d 451, 453
(1969) (emphasis added).
4. Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 507, 259 A.2d 451, 453
(1969) (stating that the move is away from the "sporting theory of justice"
to one of wide-ranging and mutual discovery); 6 WIoMoRx, EVmEc., §
1845 (1940) (the protection against the use of surprise evidence which
can be either proven false or discredited or made less damaging is the
basic advantage that discovery gives the adversary).
The decedent, Kenneth Nissley, employed as a trainman with
the defendant, wrenched his back while chasing a runaway boxcar.
Subsequent to his death, his wife as adn-inistratrix, brought an
action against the defendant on a theory that the prior back injury
was the initiating cause of death.6
On October 1, 1965, the defendant served the interrogatories
containing the controversial question. At pre-trial, plaintiff's coun-
sel agreed to answer the interrogatory by December 6; neverthe-
less on December 21, he requested additional time to answer.0
Finally, five days prior to trial plaintiff answered that pursuant
to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4011(d), 7 no answer was
required. Defendant's pre-trial motion to compel an answer was
denied, and his objections to preclude the testimony were over-
ruled.
From a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed on
two points, the pertinent one being whether it was reversible error
to allow a previously unidentified expert to testify at trial even
though the interrogatory seeking identification of the expert was
defective.
8
Generally any party may file and serve on an adverse party
written interrogatories to be answered by the party served. The
served party has a duty incumbent upon him to furnish such
information as is available to him.9 The party taking the depo-
sitions may also take the testimony of any person or party for the
purpose of discovering the identity or whereabouts of witnesses.10
Thus, it follows that the defendant would be entitled to a list of
all the plaintiff's witnesses.1
While the defendant has the right to a list of all the witnesses,
in the Nissley case he never requested such a list. 2 The decision
balanced on the weight of two contraveiling policies: use of un-
disclosed witnesses and limitation of the use of discovery. The
majority conceded that the interrogatory in question was too broad
5. The substantive basis for suit was maintained under the Federal
Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1964), and the Safety
Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1964). See Nissley v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 505 n.1, 259 A.2d 451, 452 n.1 (1969).
6. Id. at 506, 259 A.2d at 453 (Plaintiff was apparently still searching
for an expert to testify regarding the causal connection between the back
injury and the subsequent death).
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 508, 259 A.2d 451, 454
(1969) (the court, stating that this type of query is condemned by the
Rules of Civil Procedure, see note 2 supra, expressly found the query,
quoted in note 3 supra, to be too broad since it asked for all medical ex-
perts).
9. PA. R. C. P. 4005(a).
10. PA. R. C. P. 4007 (a).
11. Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 508, 259 A.2d 451, 454
(1969).
12. Id. at 512, 259 A.2d at 456.
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and that the limits of discovery had been breached. 1" Neverthe-
less, they held that the objection to the broad interrogatory must
be asserted more than five days prior to trial.14 They further sug-
gested, in dictum, that such an objection to a broad interrogatory
must like an objection to the form of an interrogatory be asserted
within ten days of the filing of the interrogatory. 15 It is difficult
to conclude whether the majority was extending Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 4005(b)' or 4004(b). 17 When read to-
gether, these rules indicate that the party may file objections to
interrogatories within ten days from the filing thereof, and ob-
jections to form of interrogatories are waived unless filed within
the allotted time, a maximum of ten days. The two rules do not
apparently provide authority for limiting the length of time in
which the objections to interrogatories, other than objections as to
the form of the interrogatories, must be made,18 or the rights
asserted by plaintiff to be protected from discovery. 19
Although not soundly supported by logic, the decision is vindi-
cated by the basic policy underlying its establishment. The court,
showing its disdain for the deployment of surprise witnesses,
stated:
However, we would be returning to the dark ages of the
rules of discovery if we were to hold that the plaintiff
could wait until the eleventh hour and use this defect as a
means to conceal the identity of a surprise witness.
20
The strength of this policy alone may be sufficient to prohibit the
introduction into evidence of the testimony designated in the un-
answered interrogatory.
2 '
13. Id. at 508, 259 A.2d at 454.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 510, 259 A.2d at 455; cf. PA. R. C. P. 4005(b): "within
ten (10) days after service of interrogatories a party may file and serve
written objections thereto. . . ." (emphasis added); PA. R. C. P. 4004(b):
"Objections to the form of interrogatories are waived unless filed and
served upon the party propounding them within the time allowed for
serving the succeeding cross or other interrogatories or within 5 days. .. .";
cross interrogatories have a maximum ten day limit, PA. R. C. P. 4004(a).
16. For basic provision of rule, see note 15, supra.
17. For basic provision of rule, see note 15, supra.
18. See PA. R. C. P. 4004(b), 4005(b), quoted note 15, supra.
19. Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 512, 259 A.2d 451, 456
(1969) (dissenting); see PA. R. C. P. 4011 for limits on discovery.
20. Id. at 508, 259 A.2d at 454.
21. PA. R. C. P. 4019 provides:
(a) The court may, on motion, make an appropriate order
if (1) a party wilfully fails to file answers or sufficient answers
to written interrogatories served under Rule 4005;
(c) The court, when acting under subdivision (a) of this rule
In evaluating the contraveiling policy, pre-trial disclosure of
expert witnesses is justified to allow an opposing party time to
prepare for cross-examination; however, not all experts consulted
are witnesses. 22  To require disclosure of all experts consulted
could be prejudicial to the plaintiff's case.
23
If the defendant had requested a list of all witnesses, a request
often used in interrogatories, the issue would have been settled.
A party has the right to a list of all witnesses.24 The request made
by plaintiff was, however, quite different. As stated the question
was prejudicial and would have been grounds for timely objection.
While the fact that the objection to the interrogatory was made a
mere five days prior to trial may vindicate the decision, the sugges-
tion that assertions to limit the scope of discovery must be made
within ten days of the filing of the interrogatory seems to be with-
out merit.
Without reference to authority, the dissent suggested that dis-
covery of witnesses could be had until three days prior to trial.
25
The three day restriction must have been a local rule, however,
since a party may file written interrogatories under Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 4005 until the time of trial subject to re-
striction or extension by the court under Rule 248.26
Limited to its facts, Nissley could be acceptable. Extended by
the suggested dictum, it could create a retraction in the use of
material which is normally within the safe harbor limits of dis-
covery. The logic of the decision fails upon an assessment of the
following sequence: (1) a question requiring no answer, and (2)
a tardy answer to the effect that no answer is required. Under the
dictum of Nissley, for failing to answer the question requiring no
answer, the witness's testimony which had been privileged from
discovery would be precluded pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 401927 from being heard at trial. When the party
filing the defective interrogatory has other proper questions at
his disposal, it would seem to be more justified to require him to
use the proper questioning rather than to deprive the tardy party
may make . .. (2) an order refusing the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting
him from introducing in evidence designated . . . testimony....
22. Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 511, 259 A.2d 451, 455
(1969).
23. Id. at 512, 259 A.2d at 456. (For example, where plaintiff con-
tacts a number of experts but only utilizes certain ones at trial, obviously,
if the defendant knows the witnesses to be employed, and those experts
consulted, it follows those not employed might not be advantageous to the
plaintiff).
24. PA. R. C. P. 4011(d), last clause; see notes 9-11 and accompanying
text supra.
25. Nissley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 435 Pa. 503, 512, 259 A.2d 451, 455
(1969) (dissenting).
26. R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON PENNSLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE § 4005.11
(1966).
27. See authority cited in note 21 supra.
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of his privileged testimony. In the Nissley case such reasoning
would have required the defendant to have requested a list of wit-
nesses, which was the proper request open to him. While the policy
of precluding "surprise witnesses" is strong, its application to a situ-
ation where the defendant had avenues of discovery open, though
not utilized, does not seem justified in policy or reason.
RONALD J. MISHKIN
